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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the reactions of the returns of four European stock markets to sovereign credit rating 
changes by Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) during the period from June 2008 to 
June 2012 using panel regression equations. We find that (i) upgrades and downgrades affect both 
own country returns and other countries’ returns, (ii) market reactions to foreign downgrades are 
stronger during the sovereign debt crisis period, and (iii) negative news from rating agencies are 
more informative than positive news. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
apital inflows to developing countries have been increasing since the mid-1990s. They have increased 
from $50 billion per year between 1987 and 1989 to more than $150 billion annually over the period 
from 1995 to 1997. Private flows came to represent 20% of domestic investment in developing countries 
in 1996, compared to only three percent in 1990. Currently, their level is about 28%. This is a result of the removal 
of barriers to international capital flows as well as improvements in communication, which have reduced the cost of 
information about foreign securities. As a consequence, it has become critical for market players and firms seeking 
foreign funds to assess all the risks associated with raising funds in international markets. 
 
As active investment decisions, the setting up of international portfolios requires several inputs. The related 
literature suggests that credit ratings are among the most important of these. Credit rating agencies are regarded as 
specialist information providers in international financial markets. In particular, they provide an overall appraisal of 
the creditworthiness of each country. Their assessments of sovereign and corporate entities have been used as 
benchmarks by governments and investors. This is particularly true in the case of institutional investors, who are 
required to invest in investment-grade instruments, which are usually defined being rated above BBB- and Baa3 by 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s, respectively. 
 
The role of credit rating agencies in the international financial system has been the subject of deep debate. 
In 2003, the Basel Committee recommended the use of external credit ratings in its new Capital Accord. In other 
words, support from this accord has caused the role of credit agencies in international financial markets to become 
very important. However, experience has demonstrated the inadequacy of rating agencies, especially in the context 
of emerging markets. Specifically, it has been shown by both practitioners and academics that credit rating agencies 
are unable to predict periods of financial turmoil (such as the Asian financial or subprime crises). Indeed, Radelet 
and Sachs (1998) note that the actions of credit rating agencies have intensified and perhaps even prolonged crises. 
Additionally, Ferri et al. (1999) argue that these agencies exhibit pro-cyclical behavior, upgrading sovereign entities 
during boom times and downgrading them during periods of crisis. Similarly, Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) have 
argued that rating agencies contribute to boom–bust cycles in international financial markets, placing emerging 
markets at risk. However, such arguments are largely based on the assumption that sovereign ratings actually 
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provide financial markets with new information, despite the fact that the current empirical evidence relating to this 
issue is far from conclusive. In particular, there are few studies focusing on the impact of rating agencies on asset 
prices (stock markets). These studies have found ambiguous evidence that rating agency signals actually impact 
security prices. Some studies support the notion that rating changes have a significant impact on stock markets 
(Cantor & Packer, 1996; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2004; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2004; Kim & Wu, 2008; Hooper et al., 
2008; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2012; Christopher et al., 2012; Treepongkaruna & Wu, 2012), whereas others do not 
(Brooks et al., 2004; Ferreira & Gama, 2007). 
 
The aim of this study is to examine empirical evidence on the effect of sovereign credit rating changes by 
international credit rating agencies on the stock markets of the most volatile European countries (Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, and Italy) during the period from June 2008 to June 2012. More specifically, our objective is to determine 
whether rating changes in individual countries affect own-stock market returns as well as those of other neighboring 
countries, thereby transmitting the crisis to those countries. 
 
Our interest in the question presented above is motivated by several factors. From a theoretical point of 
view, knowing the nature of the relationship between rating changes and stock markets allows us to better 
understand the price discovery process. From a practical point of view, “more knowledge on these issues has 
important implications for financial practices. Indeed, given the internationalization of investment portfolios, 
investment capital managers require greater and more accurate information on country risk. Consequently, it is 
important for these managers to be informed about the impact of rating changes on their portfolios. 
 
Our study is very important from an international policy perspective. Given that rating changes provide 
new information on financial markets, the international rating agencies have the ability to intensify and prolong or, 
alternatively, to weaken financial crises. In addition, this study tests the efficacy of sovereign credit ratings as 
regulatory tools within the context of the new Basel Accord on Bank Capital Requirements. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and empirical 
methodology. Section 3 reports and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
Our sovereign credit rating data for the period from June 1, 2008, to June 7, 2012 are taken from the three 
agencies that dominate the credit rating business: S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch (Duff & Einig, 2009; Alsakka & 
Gwilym, 2010). Moody’s and S&P account for 80% of the market, while Fitch’s share is 15%. This time-frame was 
chosen because several credit rating changes took place during this period (see Table 1). We focus on the four 
European countries affected by sovereign debt crises: Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Other economies, such as 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, are not included in our sample because their sovereign credit ratings did 
not experience significant changes during the selected period. The data are compiled using the Bloomberg database. 
We collected daily stock market indices for the four countries using the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
database. Stock returns are calculated as the log difference of stock indices and expressed in percentages. 
 
In order to quantify credit rating changes, we assign numerical values to letter credit ratings, similar to 
Christopher et al. (2012), Ferreira and Gama (2007), Gande and Parsley (2005), and Li et al. (2007). For letter credit 
ratings, we create a ratings scale ranging from 0 to 20, with the AAA rating taking the highest value and NR, WR, 
and C, for S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, respectively, taking the lowest value.1 Then, we create dummy variables for 
own-country as well as foreign upgrades and downgrades. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Afonso et al. (2012) use a linear scale to group ratings into 17 categories, where AAA is attributed to the 17th level and decreasing intervals of 1 
reach until below B-. Bennell et al. (2006) use the same rating scales but employ a range of 1 to 16, where decreasing intervals of 1 reach until B- 
or below. Sy (2004) assigns scores from 1 to 58 with an interval of 3. Li et al. (2008) use a total of 22 notches, where 20 is assigned to the highest 
rating, AAA, and a value of 0 is assigned to the lowest, SD. 
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For a given time   and country  , the dummy variables    and    take the following values: 
 
      
                         
                                   
  
 
      
                          
                                         
  
 
In addition to the    and    dummy variables, we consider rating changes in foreign countries. The 
dummy variables      and      take the following values: 
 
        
                                         
                            
                                                                    
  
 
        
                                         
                            
                                                                     
  
 
Table 1 summarizes ratings changes over the entire sample period and during the sovereign debt crisis 
period ranging from June 17, 2008, to June 7, 2012. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Rating Activity 
 
Number of 
upgrades 
Number of 
downgrade 
Number of foreign 
upgrades 
Number of foreign 
downgrade 
Panel A: Whole Sample 01/06/2008 – 07/06/2012 
Greece 5 24 3 30 
Portugal 0 15 8 41 
Spain 2 13 6 43 
Italy 1 8 7 48 
Panel B: Sovereign Debt Crisis Period 17/06/2010-07/06/2012 
Greece 2 13 0 21 
Portugal 0 11 2 25 
Spain 0 10 2 27 
Italy 0 6 2 31 
 
In order to study the reactions of stock market equity returns to sovereign rating upgrades and downgrades 
across these four European countries, we estimate the following two panel regression equations: 
 
                                  
 
              
 
        (1) 
 
                                   
 
                          
 
                
 
    
 
         (2) 
 
where     and        represent the stock market return in country   at time   and that in the United States (US) at 
time    , respectively.     ,     ,       , and        respectively represent upgrades in the own country, 
downgrades in the own country, upgrades in foreign countries, and downgrades in foreign countries. Four-day lags 
and leads for own-country rating changes are included in both Equations (1) and (2). In Equation (2), which 
examines the contagion effect, we include only foreign upgrades and downgrades with two-day lags and two-day 
leads in order to avoid over-parameterization. The coefficient of foreign rating changes in Equation (2) (foreign 
upgrades and downgrades) measures the contagion effect. 
 
Leads in Equations (1) and (2) are used in order to test the pro-market-performance behavior of the credit 
rating agencies (Li et al., 2007). According to this hypothesis, the credit rating agencies follow market performance: 
they upgrade their credit ratings when markets are already booming and downgrade them only after markets have 
entered a slump. 
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3. ESTIMATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients of Equations (1) and (2). These estimations
2
 are conducted for 
both periods. The first estimation is realized for the entire sample period (June 2008 – June 2012) in order to 
evaluate overall stock market reactions. A second estimation is conducted for the debt crisis period (June 2010 – 
June 2012) in order to focus only on the stock market reaction to sovereign credit rating changes during the debt 
crisis period. 
 
There is evidence that sovereign debt rating change announcements aﬀect stock markets. The 
autoregressive term coefficients,   , are negative and statistically significant, indicating a negative autocorrelation of 
stock returns. The coefficients on changes in US stock returns are all positive and significant, providing evidence 
that the US market has a strong impact. 
 
Table 2: The Impact of Own and Foreign Rating Changes on Stock Returns 
 Eq. (1) Eq. (2) 
 Whole Period 
Sovereign Debt  
Crisis Period 
Whole Period 
Sovereign Debt  
Crisis Period 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient p-value 
   -0.049*** 0.005 -0.046*** 0.004 -0.049*** 0.003 -0.041*** 0.004 
   -0.040*** 0.001 -0.040*** 0.002 -0.041*** 0.001 -0.040*** 0.002 
   0.057* 0 .015 0.038* 0.096 0.058** 0.014 0.039* 0.094 
Upgrades 
      0.693 0.252 0.667 0.222 0.863 0.246 0.858 0.215 
      1.008* 0.096 1.003* 0.066 0.778 0.296 0.766 0.268 
     -1.029* 0.089 -1.056* 0.053 -0.918 0.218 -0.961 0.166 
      -0.579 0.338 -0.586 0.283 -0.590 0.329 -0.591 0.279 
      0.277 0.646 0.272 0.619 0.261 0.666 0.269 0.623 
       -0.655 0.279 -0.689 0.207 -0.246 0.741 -0.258 0.709 
       -0.415 0.492 -0.401 0.463 -0.606 0.416 -0.585 0.398 
       -0.051 0.933 -0.051 0.925 -0.070 0.907 -0.055 0.919 
       0.388 0.521 0.369 0.499 0.373 0.537 0.360 0.510 
Downgrades 
      -0.125 0.453 -0.106 0.526 -0.019 0.925 -0.040 0.840 
      0.272 0.104 0.284* 0.087 0.445** 0.030 0.337* 0.093 
     -0.414* 0.013 -0.052 0.754 -0.328 0.109 -0.063 0.753 
      0.316* 0.058 -0.036 0.829 0.307* 0.066 -0.042 0.799 
      -0.119 0.475 -0.337** 0.043 -0.131 0.435 -0.342** 0.040 
       -0.592** 0.000 -0.687*** 0.000 -0.933*** 0.000 -0.997*** 0.000 
       -0.277 0.096 0.005 0.974 -0.305 0.137 -0.004 0.985 
       -0.093 0.577 -0.107 0.520 -0.106 0.526 -0.113 0.494 
       0.168 0.311 0.488*** 0.003 0.176 0.287 0.501*** 0.002 
Foreign Upgrades 
          0.219 0.690 0.237 0.651 
          -0.293 0.595 -0.294 0.575 
         0.106 0.847 0.089 0.866 
           0.521 0.343 0.532 0.310 
           -0.233 0.672 -0.233 0.657 
Foreign Downgrades 
          0.156 0.394 0.099 0.571 
          0.273 0.139 -0.086* 0.076 
         0.098 0.596 -0.042* 0.083 
           -0.536*** 0.004 -0.499*** 0.005 
           -0.025 0.893 -0.009** 0.032 
Log Likelihood -15219.682 -17479.909 -15240.466 -18513.901 
Number of 
observations 
4192 2012 4192 2012 
*, **, *** Represents statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
                                                          
2 The estimation is conducted through a random effect model using maximum likelihood. All specifications tests are undertaken prior to 
estimation. 
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The estimation of Equation (1) for the entire sample period shows that rating upgrades increase next-day, 
own-country stock returns by one percent. After two days, reverting behavior is exhibited and stock returns decrease 
by 1.03%. In the case of downgrades, own-country stock returns decrease by 0.41% after two days and increase by 
0.32% after three days. The significant and negative lead coefficient (for downgrades) of one day supports the 
argument that credit rating agencies engage in pro-market-performance behavior. 
 
The estimation of Equation (1) during the sovereign debt crisis period produces qualitative results that are 
very similar to those for the entire sample period. However, during the sovereign debt crisis period, there is some 
evidence of a mix of additional pro-market-performance rating changes occurring after one and four days. 
 
To further investigate the different impacts of foreign upgrades and downgrades, we estimate Equation (2). 
Only the coefficients of foreign downgrades are significant; during the sovereign crisis period, in response to foreign 
downgrades, stock returns decrease by 0.09% the next day and 0.04% after two days. The significant and negative 
coefficient of lead variables demonstrates the existence of pro-market performance behavior by the credit rating 
agencies only in relation to negative ratings. Therefore, negative rating events impact own-country equity returns 
and cause significant spillovers to the equity markets of other countries, whereas upgrades have limited or 
insignificant impact (Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2002; Brooks et al., 2004; Sy, 2004; Ferreira & Gama, 2007; Hill & 
Faff, 2010; Afonso, 2011; Alsakka & ap Gwilym, 2013). This latter effect is more important during the sovereign 
debt crisis period. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper complements previous research on the impact of sovereign rating changes on stock markets. We 
examine the effect of international credit rating agency announcements on the domestic and cross-country stock 
market returns of four European countries, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, during the period from June 2008 to 
June 2013. 
 
The results show that sovereign credit signals do have an impact on stock market returns, although there are 
differing reactions to news from the rating agencies. Importantly, the strongest market reactions are in response to 
own-country and foreign downgrades. During the sovereign debt crisis, negative announcements affected own-
country stock market returns and contributed to contagion. By examining the dynamic of lead variables related to 
rating changes, we find consistent empirical evidence that credit rating agencies exhibited pro-market-performance 
behavior during the entire sample period as well as during the crisis; i.e., announcing the rating changes afterwards. 
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